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Summary 
 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act,1 
hereinafter referred to as SORMA, came into operation on 16 December 2007 and 
acknowledges in its preamble, the then current, inadequate and discriminatory 
measures provided for in common law and statute relating to sexual offences. 
Although it aimed to address these measures, through the repeal of various common 
law sexual offences and the introduction, or amendment, of comprehensive statutory 
offences relating to sexual offences against children and vulnerable individuals, the 
legislature failed to take advantage of a golden opportunity; being the introduction of 
inquisitorial elements in the South African sexual offences legal framework.2  
 
Through the introduction of SORMA, provisions relating to sexual offences against 
children were introduced, unfortunately it included sexual offences amongst children 
as well.3 However, this was declared unconstitutional in The Teddy Bear Clinic for 
Abused Children and Rapcan v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,4 
and Parliament was allowed 18 months to rectify the defect in the enactment. 
Although, Parliament failed to abide by the time period provided by the Constitutional 
Court, a larger disappointment was on the horizon; the realisation that the applicants’ 
constitutional challenge was too narrow. This, together with the lack of foresight on 
the part of the legislature, lead to SORMA, even in its amended form, being mainly 
accusatorial in nature. Furthermore, and despite the amendments, SORMA failed to 
completely decriminalise consensual sexual activity between children.  
 
Despite its shortcomings, SORMA could be said to provide adequate provisions 
relating to all possible sexual offences against children and vulnerable individuals. 
However, the shortcomings are not restricted to the provisions of the enactment, the 
shortcomings relate to the application thereof. Should inquisitorial elements be 
                                                      
1   32 of 2007. 
2   Stevens “Decriminalising consensual sexual acts between adolescents within a  
   constitutional framework: The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of  
   Justice and Constitutional Development and Others Case: 73300/10 [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 (4  
   January 2013)” 2013 1 SACJ 41 41; Stevens “Recent Developments in Sexual  
   Offences against Children – A Constitutional Perspective” 2016 19 PER/PELJ 2 4. 
3   Stevens 2013 SACJ 41. 
4   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 and 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) respectively. 
  
introduced, the focus of the trial would shift away from the victim and shift on to the 
accused, thereby extending the protection offered to children and vulnerable 
individuals to the maximum extent. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act,1 
hereinafter referred to as SORMA, came into operation on 16 December 2007 and 
acknowledges in its preamble, the then current, inadequate and discriminatory 
measures provided for in common law and statute relating to sexual offences. 
SORMA, aimed to address these measures, through the repeal of various common 
law sexual offences and the introduction, or amendment, of comprehensive statutory 
offences relating to sexual offences against children and vulnerable individuals.2 
Furthermore, the South African Criminal law structure is accusatorial and retributive in 
nature, although it does contain some inquisitorial elements. This proves severely 
detrimental to victims, as they may feel like the accused during the trial, and especially 
during cross-examination, since most sexual offence cases revolves around the issue 
of consent.3 
 
The discussion to follow will assess the consequences resulting from the 
commencement of SORMA, through the assessment of the prior position of the legal 
framework relating to sexual offences and subsequent development thereof. This will 
provide the background relating to some of the provisions contained in SORMA, 
establishing common law as the origin of some sections. Furthermore, it will assess 
whether the aim of the Act, being the offering of the least traumatizing protection, 
which includes the prevention of secondary victimization, has been achieved or 
whether more appropriate inquisitorial procedures should be available. Moreover, the 
provisions relating to consensual sexual activity between children, introduced by the 
commencement of SORMA, which were susceptible to various contentions, as raised 
                                                      
1   32 of 2007. 
2   Stevens “Decriminalising consensual sexual acts between adolescents within a  
   constitutional framework: The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of  
   Justice and Constitutional Development and Others Case: 73300/10 [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 (4  
   January 2013)” 2013 1 SACJ 41 41; Stevens “Recent Developments in Sexual  
   Offences against Children – A Constitutional Perspective” 2016 19 PER/PELJ 2 4. 
3   Erasmus “The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill and Vulnerable Witnesses: A  
   Missed Opportunity” 2007 22 SAPR/PL 507 508-510. 
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in The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Rapcan v Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development,4 will be discussed in detail to provide understanding and 
reasoning for the subsequent amendment to SORMA. Through emphasis being 
placed on the amendments, purporting to decriminalise consensual sexual activity 
which infringed on the rights of children, it will be shown that although the amendment 
achieved this, it failed to fully decriminalise consensual sexual activity between all 
children. 
 
1 1  Aim of the study 
 
The aim of this study is to firstly, investigate, analyse and establish whether the South 
African legislation sufficiently protects the rights of children and vulnerable individuals 
in sexual offences matters and secondly, whether legislative amendments are 
required to enhance SORMA’s effectiveness. The focus will be on the key legal 
principles relevant to finding that a sexual offence has been committed, with specific 
reference to children and vulnerable individuals, and in light of South African case law.  
 
1 2  Methodology  
 
Firstly, this research takes the form of a literature study. The legislative framework that 
was in place prior to the decimalization of consensual sexual activity between children 
will be set out. Through this examination, case law both before and after the 
amendment, articles in law journals and text books were consulted. Secondly, the 
researcher will investigate the legal position currently set out in the South African 
legislative framework, in order to determine its effectiveness, with specific reference 
to children and vulnerable individuals.  
 
1 3 Outline of The Study  
 
Chapter one sets out the aim and background of the study, the methodology used and 
the scope of the research.  Chapter two entails a discussion of the development in the 
law relating to sexual offences in South Africa with specific reference to children, 
                                                      
4   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 and 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) respectively. 
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considering the position prior to the introduction of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences 
and Related Matters) Amendment Act.5 Chapter three deals with the contentions of 
SORMA in its pre-amended form, with specific reference to the crimination of 
consensual sexual activity between children. Chapter four deals with SORMA in its 
post Constitutional Court challenge phase, taking into consideration the amendments 
proposed and golden opportunities missed in its amended form. Chapter five will 
evaluate the current legal position regarding consensual sexual activity between 
children and will highlight the shortcomings the post Constitutional Court challenge 
amendments. Chapter 6 will assess whether further amendments are currently being 
considered in parliament and will propose legislative amendments to SORMA. 
Chapter 7 summarises the research and draws conclusions based on the discussion 
in the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
5   32 of 2007. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Development of the law relating to sexual offences in South Africa with 
specific reference to children 
 
In order to understand the implications of the commencement of SORMA, it is 
necessary to firstly explain the position, with specific reference to sexual offences 
against children, prior to its enactment. 
 
2 1   The position prior to the introduction of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Amendment Act 
 
With the advent of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996, hereinafter 
referred to as the Constitution, significant changes in the legal framework of South 
Africa became a necessity, in order to enable legislative alignment with the rights 
guaranteed by the supreme law of our country. The law, both common law and 
enacted law, relating to sexual offences, were no exception, since the provisions 
contained therein, were inundated, discriminatory and in clear violation of the 
Constitution.6  
 
The common law definition of rape referred to the male as the offender, and the female 
as the victim, and only made provision for vaginal penetration to constitute rape.7 
Accordingly, the common law offence of rape was not gender neutral, as only females 
were protected, and men were left in a vulnerable position.8  
 
Prior to the enactment of SORMA, section 14 of the then-titled Immorality Act,9  
hereinafter referred to as the Sexual Offences Act, made provision for consensual 
sexual activity between children of certain ages. ‘The sexual offences against youths’ 
                                                      
6   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law (2014) 599-601; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ  2. 
7   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 595, 599; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 2. 
8   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 595, 597-599, 601; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 2. 
9    23 of 1957 as amended by The Immorality Amendment Act 57 of 1969 and The Immorality  
   Amendment Act 2 of 1988, which renamed the Act as the Sexual Offences Act. 
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provision,10 made heterosexual sexual activity with another person, under the age of 
16, a criminal offence,11 since consent given by a person under the age of 16-years-
old was not recognised in law.12 Furthermore, homosexual activity, included under the 
term ‘immoral or indecent acts’ in the Sexual Offences Act,13 required both parties to 
such activity, whether male or female, to be at least 19-years-old.14  
 
The defences available under common law and the Sexual Offences Act,15 with regard 
to consensual sexual activity with children, were as follows; Firstly, in terms of the 
common law, any girl younger than 12-years-old, could not consent to sexual activity. 
As such, this common law provision could operate as a defence, which could be 
invoked against the other consenting party to the sexual activity, being a child 12-
years-old or older.16 Secondly, if the accused person was deceived into believing the 
other party to the sexual activity was 16-years-old or older, it could be raised as a 
defence to a charge of ‘unlawful carnal intercourse’.17 However, before the 
commencement of the Immorality Amendment Act,18 another defence was available, 
being; Provision was made that should the male offender, who committed ‘unlawful 
carnal intercourse’ with a female under the age of 16-years-old, be under the age of 
16-years-old himself, it would operate as a ‘sufficient defence’.19  
 
The Immorality Amendment Act20 attempted to introduce gender neutrality to the 
criminal offence of ‘unlawful carnal intercourse’.21 This was clearly indicated by the 
introduction of females as possible sex offenders, thereby providing for males and 
females, irrespective of age, as possible victims.22 A fundamental flaw in the Act, 
                                                      
10   As section 14 of 2 of 1988 was termed. 
11   Section 14(1)(a) and section 14(3)(a) of 23 of 1957 as amended by 2 of 1988.  
12   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Report 2002 52. 
13   Section 14(1)(b) of 23 of 1957. 
14   Sections 14(1)(b) and 14(3)(b) of 23 of 1957 as amended by 57 of 1969 and 2 of 1988; South 
   African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Report 52. 
15   23 of 1957 as amended by 57 of 1969 and 2 of 1988, which renamed the Act as the 
    Sexual Offences Act. 
16   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Report 53-54; Snyman Criminal Law 
   (2014) 354-355.  
17   Section 14(2)(c) and section 14(4)(b) of 23 of 1957 as amended by 57 of 1969 and 2 of 1988; 
   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Report 56-57. 
18   2 of 1988. 
19   Section 14(2)(b) of 57 of 1969, amended by 2 of 1988 through the removal of this defence. 
20   2 of 1988.  
21   Milton “The Sexual Offences Act” 1988 2 SACJ 269 269. 
22   Ibid; Sections 14(3) and 14(4) of 2 of 1988; South African Law Commission Project 107  
   Sexual Offences Report 52. 
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especially when considering the attempted introduction of gender neutrality, related to 
the defined, or rather undefined, term of ‘unlawful carnal intercourse’.23 As a result, 
the common law definition of rape remained in place, which provided for vaginal 
penetration, and no other orifice.24 However, in Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions25 the court extended the common law definition of rape to include the 
non-consensual penetration of the anus of a woman.26 The case was decided on 10 
May 2007, a mere seven months before the commencement of  SORMA. Although 
the court recognised the definition of rape as contained in the SORMA Bill,27 being a 
definition without gender discrimination, including penetration of anal or vaginal 
orifices, the court did not extend the common law definition of rape to include males.28 
As such, it is submitted that gender neutrality could not be fully attained prior to the 
commencement of the SORMA.29 
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that the legal age of consent was 16-years-
old or older, but that discrimination remained present in the legal framework, for sexual 
offences in South Africa, even after the commencement of the Constitution. This had 
to be addressed by the amendment of applicable law and was subsequently attempted 
by the enactment of SORMA.30 
 
2 2   The position after to the commencement of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences  
      and Related Matters) Amendment Act and the protection offered thereby 
 
The point of departure is to be found in the long title of the Act. SORMA states the true 
purpose of the enactment in clear terms as being; Firstly, the provision of certain 
services to minimize or eliminate secondary traumatization. Secondly, to provide 
procedures, defenses and evidentiary matters in the prosecution and adjudication of 
sexual offences. Thirdly, the protection of vulnerable groups, such as children, against 
sexual offences. This resulted in the repeal of the common law applicable to rape and 
                                                      
23   Section 1 of 23 of 1957 provided for ‘carnal intercourse otherwise between husband and wife’.  
24   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 595. 
25   2007 (5) SA 30 (CC). 
26   [39] [45] [46] [74]; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 595. 
27   B50-2003. 
28   Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) [41]. 
29   Stevens 2013 SACJ 41; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 601. 
30   Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ  2. 
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indecent assault, through the introduction of comprehensive statutory provisions 
dealing therewith. Fourthly, the eradication of ‘secondary victimisation’ through the 
provision of adequate protection against sexual offences, including the introduction of 
new provisions dealing specifically with children. Lastly, the provision of a non-
discriminatory and effective approach to the issues surrounding sexual offences,31 
having regard to the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including the best interest 
of the child principle.32 
 
To this end, the purpose of the enactment seemed to be consistent with the values 
underpinning the Constitution. However, some of the provisions in its pre-amendment 
form achieved the opposite of the intended purpose, especially relating to children.33 
This, together with the protection measures provided for in the Act will be introduced 
in the discussion to follow.34 
 
2 3  The pitfalls of SORMA and protection measures offered therein 
 
Although SORMA introduced provisions relating to sexual offences against children, 
unfortunately it included sexual offences amongst children as well.35  The point of 
departure is the definition provided for children, being as a person under the age of 
18.36 However, an exception was provided for, which referred to sections 15 and 16, 
in which case if a child was considered 12-years-old or older, but under 16-years-old.37 
These two sections are of particular importance and will be discussed first, whereafter 
general provisions and specific sexual offences, with specific refence to children, will 
be discussed individually, in order to assess the protection measures offered by the 
Act.  
 
 
 
                                                      
31   Long title, Preamble and section 2 of 32 of 2007; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 2-3. 
32   Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,1996. 
33   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [92]. 
34   Chapter 4 and 5 below. 
35   Stevens 2013 SACJ 41. 
36   Section 1(1)(a) of 32 of 2007 prior to the amendment. 
37   Section 1(1)(b) of 32 of 2007 prior to the amendment. 
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2 3 1  Section 15 – ‘Acts of consensual sexual penetration with certain children 
(statutory rape)’ 
 
This section made penetration with a child, defined as a person older than 12-years-
old but younger than 16-years old, notwithstanding consent, a criminal offence. 
Furthermore, if both parties to the activity were children at the time of the alleged 
offence, both had to be charged with the commission of the offence. The only proviso 
being the applicability of prosecutorial discretion, that should both parties be children, 
the National Director of Public Prosecution had to authorise the prosecution.38 
 
The section clearly makes provision for three scenarios; firstly, where any person 
engages in consensual sexual penetration with a child younger than 12-years-old. 
Secondly, where a person, not being a part of the mentioned age group of a child, 
engages in consensual sexual penetration with a child, 12-years-old or older, but 
under 16-years-old. Thirdly, where both parties are between 12 and 16-years-old.39 
The second scenario thus includes 16 and 17-year-old children.40 
 
2 3 2  Section 16 – ‘Acts of consensual sexual violation with certain children 
(statutory sexual assault)’ 
 
This section provides for the same provisions as section 15, the only difference being; 
Firstly, the type of sexual activity required to constitute an offence and secondly, the 
identity of the authorising organ of state, being the Director of Public Prosecutions in 
this section. Once again, as with section 15, 16-year-old and 17-year-old children are 
included in ‘any person who’ and as such do not fall into the mentioned age group for 
a child, in terms of this section.41 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
38   Jordaan “General principles and specific offences” 2013 3 SACJ 364 376. 
39   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 376. 
40   Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 4-5. 
41   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 376-377. 
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2 3 3  Section 56 – ‘Defences’ 
 
The only fundamental difference, besides the requisite activity, between the two 
sections, mentioned directly above, related to the defence available to accused 
children.42 
 
The first defence makes provision for, and is basically an amended version of the 
defence available in terms of the Sexual Offences Act,43 relating to deceit, which is 
applicable to both section 15 and 16.44 This defence could be successfully raised 
should the facts fit the elements of the defence, provides for the scenario where the 
offender was deceived into believing the other party to the sexual activity is over 16-
years-old and the offender reasonably believed this misrepresentation.45 
 
The second defence, only applicable to the offence of sexual violation,46 provides for 
the scenario where both parties to the consensual sexual violation are children and 
there are no more than two years’ age difference between the parties, they may raise 
this as a defence.47 Thus, this age-gap defence could only be raised if the parties were 
children, being under the age of 18-years-old but older than 12-years-old, and the 
parties had an age-gap of less than two years. An age-gap of more than two years, if 
authorised by the Director of Public Prosecution, would result in both parties being 
prosecuted.48 
 
2 3 4  Section 42 – ‘Establishment of the National Register for Sex Offenders’ 
 
SORMA makes provision for the establishment of a National Register for Sex 
Offenders, hereinafter referred to as the register, which was presupposed to contain 
particulars of child sex offenders.49 The object of the register is stated as being the 
protection of children and mentally disabled individuals from persons convicted of 
                                                      
42   Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 5-6. 
43   Sections 14(2)(c) and 14(4)(b) of 23 of 1957. 
44   Section 56(2)(a) of 32 0f 2007. 
45   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Report 54; Snyman Criminal Law 
    385-386. 
46   Section 16 of 32 of 2007; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 6. 
47   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 376; Section 56(2)(b) of 32 of 2007 prior to the amendment. 
48   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 377. 
49   Section 42 of 32 of 2007. 
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sexual offences against this protected group. 50 Furthermore, the consequences of 
entry of particulars into the register, include; Firstly, prospective employers being 
informed of the prospective employee’s inclusion in the register and secondly, care-
giving and adoption authorities being informed of the prospective caregiver’s inclusion 
in the register.51 Thus, the particulars of children who were prosecuted for engaging 
in consensual sexual activity, whether in terms of section 15 or 16, were to be entered 
into the register.52 Thus, the National Register for Sex Offenders mechanism will not 
only protect vulnerable groups, but all citizens from the potential consequences of 
sexual offences. Unfortunately, this database has not yet taken its envisaged form and 
has subsequently not reached its full potential. 53   
 
In addition to the Register, the victim of a sexual offence has the right to compel the 
sexual offender to be subjected to HIV testing, in order to establish whether they may 
be infected or not. Although this protects the future health of victims and provides 
some form of closure, as they will not have to endure anxiety or fear of becoming HIV 
positive in the future, they must apply to a magistrate within 90 days to do so, and 
must lay a charge of the sexual offence at a police station. Thus, it is a restrictive 
protective mechanism, since the effects of the accusatorial system will be 
unavoidable.54 
 
2 3 5  Section 54 – ‘Obligation to report the commission of sexual offences against  
children or persons who are mentally disabled’ 
 
This section makes the reporting of sexual offences mandatory for any person who 
bears knowledge of such activity. 55 Furthermore, a penalty is imposed on a knowledge 
bearer who does not report such activity, including imprisonment.56 Thus, 
organisations working with children in the advancement of sexual and reproductive 
                                                      
50   Sections 42(1) and 43(a)(i) of 32 of 2007. 
51   Section 43(a)(b)(d) of 32 of 2007; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of  
   Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [57]. 
52   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 374-376. 
53   Jordaan 2013 SACJ 374-376; Parliamentary Monitory Group “Summary of Comments on Criminal 
   Law (Sexual Offences) Amendment Bill” (2003) http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west- 
   1.amazonaws.com/docs/2004/appendices/040126summary.htm (accessed 2018-10-18). 
54   Ibid. 
55   Section 54(1)(a) of 32 of 2007. 
56   Section 54(1)(b) of 32 of 2007. 
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health services and medical practitioners are included in this group, if they bear 
knowledge, since there are no exceptions to the mandatory reporting.57 
 
2 3 6  General provisions of importance 
 
SORMA contains various provisions which are of importance, such as the definition of 
rape in common law, which was expanded on in the Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions58 judgment. The definition now includes anal penetration of males under 
the definition of sexual penetration and offers comprehensive provisions relating to 
sexual exploitation and grooming of children, as will be discussed as a protective 
measure hereunder.59 Furthermore, the common law position regarding consent from 
a 12-year-old, was expressly repealed by SORMA, through the rendering of consent 
obtained from a person, whether from a male or female, under 12-years-old, as 
invalid.60  This age is the actual age of the child and not mental capacity; it is irrelevant 
whether 9-year-old has the mental capacity of a 14-year-old. Thus, this section refers 
to the legal age of the child.61  
 
2 3 7 Specific sexual offences standing as protective measures against vulnerable 
 groups of individuals 
 
 i Sexual exploitation under section 17 
 
Although the Act refers to sexual exploitation, this section amounts to nothing more 
than the sale of sex. It provides that any person who unlawfully and intentionally 
engages the services of a child in sexual activity, irrespective of consent and 
irrespective whether the act is actually committed or not, for financial reward to the 
child or another, will be guilty of the offence of sexual exploitation of a child.62 It is 
submitted that this section goes a long way in the protection of children from sexual 
exploitation, since the actual commission of the sexual act is not a requisite. Thus, the 
                                                      
57   Bhamjee, Essack and Strode “Amendments to the Sexual Offences Act dealing with consensual  
   underage sex: Implications for doctors and researchers” 2016 106 3 SAMJ 256 256. 
58   2007 (5) SA 30 (CC) [39].  
59   Sections 1,17 and 18 of 32 of 2007 respectively. 
60   Section 57 of 32 of 2007; Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 601-602. 
61   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 608. 
62   Sections 17 of 32 of 2007. 
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child is protected from the trauma of having to be sexually exploited first, before the 
law will protect them. 
 
This section goes further and criminalizes the offering of such services and the 
partaking in and promoting of and facilitating the act, as the person will be guilty of 
being involved in the sexual exploitation of a child. 
 
Section 17 thus criminalizes the engaging in; the involvement in; the furthering; the 
benefiting; living of the earnings and the promoting of sexual exploitation of children. 
Also of importance is that section 17(1) and section 11 is worded along the same lines, 
except for the age difference being applicable. 63 Thus, the protection afforded to 
children in terms of section 17 is also afforded to other vulnerable groups who are over 
the age of 18. The sex for sale provisions are thus very broad in nature and will come 
into play even when the act is not committed. This is clearly for the protection of 
children and other vulnerable groups of individuals and is one of the sections which 
gives effect to the Act’s aims.64 However, provisions relating to sex for sale has been 
long contested. Some authorities are of the view that it should indeed be criminalized, 
whilst other believe the opposite.65 What is important to note is that both section 11 
and section 17 only provides for criminal liability for the paying customer, not for the 
sex worker. It is submitted that it should not be criminalized. The reasons therefore 
are; Firstly, if a sex worker is raped, secondary trauma and victimization is 
unavoidable. Secondly, since she/he is a sex worker, the public will assume the person 
made peace with the possibility of a sexual offence being committed against him or 
her. Thirdly, during the trial, some questions may be put to the victim which will relate 
to the sex work of the victim, which might result in the victim not being taken as 
seriously as other victims.66  Thus, the effects of the accusatorial system will once 
more be unavoidable. 
 
This argument is based on the foundation that our criminal justice system is 
accusatorial in nature. If, however, as is discussed below, inquisitorial elements were 
                                                      
63   Sections 17 and section 11 of 32 of 2007. 
64   As stated in the preamble of 32 of 2007.  
65   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Adult Prostitution Report 2015 1 4-7. 
66   South African Law Commission Project 107 Sexual Offences Adult Prostitution Report 7-11. 
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introduced in the Act, the presiding officer could steer the line of questioning and result 
in secondary trauma and victimization being avoided. 67 
 
 ii Sexual grooming under section 18 
 
The underlying reliance and focus of this section is intention. No offence needs to 
occur, the mere intention of promoting or engaging; such as the facilitating or 
encouragement to engage in; sexual grooming of a child, is sufficient for this section 
to find application. Thus, much like section 17, the child is protected against an 
eventuality, in that the child or vulnerable individual does not need to suffer harm 
before the law will protect them. The mere intention/possibility of harm is sufficient to 
charge someone with the offence of sexual grooming of a child. It is thus submitted 
that the consent of the child is irrelevant to the offence being committed.68 
 
 iii The exposure or display of pornography to children under section 19 
 
This section does not only deal with the exposure of child pornography to children, but 
also pornography involving over 18-year-olds to children. Although this section aims 
to protect children, it is submitted that it could have been worded better. The provisions 
dealing with pornography involving individuals over 18-years-old, should have been 
construed narrower. 69 Although the section makes provision for age-inappropriate 
material for children, it has to be borne in mind that 17-year-olds are considered 
children in terms of the Act. If a child of the said age is exposed to pornography to 
which he consents, it will per the law be age-inappropriate, although in society such 
occurrences might be normal amongst young men and women.70 This is so because 
the offence will be committed irrespective of the consent of the child. It is submitted 
that the age distinction applicable to section 15 and section 16, could have been 
extended to this section as well.71 
                                                      
67   Erasmus 2007 SAPR/PL 509. 
68   Section 18(1) – 18(2) of 32 of 2007. 
69   Section 19(c) of 32 of 2008. 
70   According to statistics, children between 12-years-old and 17-years-old are the biggest  
   consumers of internet pornography and 90% of children between 8-years-old and 16-years-old 
   have seen pornography on the internet; Guardchild “Protecting Children in the Digital Age” (2018) 
   https://www.guardchild.com/statistics/ (accessed 2018-10-28). 
71   Vis a vis Section 19(c) and section 15 and 16 of 32 of 2007. 
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 iv The use of children for benefitting from child pornography under section 
  20 
 
This very simple worded and effective provision protects children from being used in 
the production of child pornography, irrespective of the consent of the child. 
Furthermore, it not only imposes criminal liability on the person who uses a child for 
such a purpose, but also imposes liability on the persons who receive a financial 
advantage form such material. Being narrow and effective, this section achieves its 
goal and is not likely to be open to ambiguous interpretations, thereby serving its goal 
as a protective measure against vulnerable individuals.  
 
 v Compelling or causing children to witness sexual offenses under section 
  21 
 
This section criminalizes the unlawful and intentional exposure of children or to have 
the child be present or witness, a sexual offence, a sexual act or self-masturbation. At 
first glance it seems to be effective, however, it is submitted that it is subject to one 
fundamental flaw.  
 
In this section, if the child consents, no offence will be committed.72 It is submitted that 
this is a legislative oversight, since it could hardly be the intention of the legislature to 
void a vulnerable individual’s consent to the viewing of or watching of pornography, 
but allow them to consent to the viewing of or watching and being present while a 
sexual offence, sexual act or self-masturbation is being carried out. Thus, this section 
does not achieve the goal of protecting children or other vulnerable groups. Rather, it 
protects the individual who makes the child susceptible to such viewing, as such a 
person could influence the child in order to escape criminal liability.  
 
This section should rather read, ‘with or without the consent of the child’, in order to 
protect children and vulnerable individuals from such activity.  
 
                                                      
72   Section 21(1) and (2) of 32 of 2007. 
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 vi  The exposure or display of genital organs (anus or female breasts) to 
  children under section 22 
 
This section appears to be stricter than section 21 discussed above, since it 
criminalizes the unlawful and intentional display of genital organs, anus or female 
breasts to a child, which is done with or without the consent of the child. It is 
nonsensical to void the consent of a child to view female breasts but to allow him or 
her to consent to view it while a sexual offence is committed, in terms of section 21.73 
 
Considering the above and when considering the mandatory reporting provisions 
applicable under the Act, it is clear that the Act provides mechanisms to protect 
vulnerable groups of individuals. However, the problem that arises is that the aim of 
the Act, being the eradicating of secondary victimization is not achieved. This 
submission is based on the premise that the law protects the vulnerable individuals 
from sexual offences and offenders, but the law continues to rely heavily on these 
victims, in order to enforce the protection and provisions under the Act. Since many 
rape trials are centered around the issue of consent, the victim will often feel like the 
accused during the trial. This could have been avoided by the introduction of 
inquisitorial elements into the procedure and provisions under SORMA.74 Although 
some of the sections mentioned above contain the words ‘with or without consent’, 
which can be seen as an attempt to steer the trial away from the notion of consent, it 
does not prevent the effects of the accusatorial system on the victims, and as such 
results in the Act falling short of all its aims.  
 
Furthermore, and with regard to the position after the commencement of SORMA, the 
attempt by the legislature to remove discrimination, based on gender, from the law 
applicable to sexual offences, is in line with the purpose of SORMA, being the 
protection of the vulnerable from sexual offences.75 However, through the attempt of 
creating an all-encompassing broad termed Act, the legislature opened the door for 
constitutional attacks on various provisions of SORMA. 
                                                      
73   Vis a vis section 21 and 22 of 32 of 2007. 
74   Erasmus 2007 SAPR/PL 509, 512-514. 
75   Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 601-602. 
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The contentions of the mentioned provisions will now be discussed in detail, with 
reference to the arguments presented and decision delivered, in the court a quo and 
the Constitutional Court in The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Rapcan v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
76   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 and 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) respectively. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The contentions of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related  
Matters) Amendment Act 
 
The contentions of SORMA, related specifically to sections 15 and section 16, were 
one of the cornerstones for the applicant’s argument in The Teddy Bear Clinic for 
Abused Children and Rapcan v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,77 
which saw these contentious provisions being declared unconstitutional. These 
sections, although intended to uphold the best interest of the child principle in terms 
of section 28 of the Constitution, through the provision of protection from sexual 
offenders, have unfortunately also affected a larger, more vulnerable group of 
persons, through the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity between children.78  
 
Further contentions were; Firstly, s56(2) of SORMA, relating to the defences towards 
sections 15 and 16 of SORMA and the compulsory inclusion of the particulars of 
persons, who were convicted of sexual offences in the register in terms of Chapter 6 
of SORMA, including the particulars of children, if so convicted.79 Secondly, the 
compulsory reporting by a person who bears knowledge that such an offence has 
been committed by a child under the age of 18, to a police official.80 Thus, the 
challenge towards the provisions related to the criminalisation of consensual sexual 
conduct between children and the ensuing reporting81 and registering82 of their 
particulars in the register.83 The underlying basis’ for the contentions will now be 
discussed with reference to the arguments presented to court. 
  
 
 
 
                                                      
77   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 and 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) respectively. 
78   Stevens 2013 SACJ 53. 
79   Stevens 2013 SACJ 53; Section 50(1)(a)(i); Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 7-8. 
80   Stevens 2013 SACJ 53; Section 54 of 32 of 2007. 
81   Ibid. 
82   Stevens 2013 SACJ 53; Sections 50(1)(a)(i) and 50(2)(a)(i) of 32 of 2007. 
83   Stevens 2013 SACJ 45; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 7-9. 
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3 1  The arguments raised by the applicants 
 
Although the applicants recognised the attempt on the part of the legislature to protect 
vulnerable persons from sexual offences, particularly children, it was put before the 
court that the challenged provisions had the complete opposite effect by causing harm 
instead of providing the intended protection.84 
 
The harm caused, the applicants contended, related to the undue and premature 
introduction of children in to the criminal justice system. Harm, they argued, was 
amplified when reading sections 15 and 16 of SORMA, in the light of the compulsory 
reporting85 and registering86 of children as sex offenders in the register. It follows, in 
the applicants’ argument, that the harm would consequently result in children with 
unnatural stances and consideration of what they consider to be healthy sexual 
behaviour.87 This in turn, according to the applicants, would lead to children not 
seeking assistance or access to reproductive and sexual health services, as promoted 
by the legislature through various legislative enactments, due to fear of prosecution.88  
 
In support of the argument regarding sexual health services being compromised by 
the challenged provisions, specifically by the compulsory reporting provisions, the 
applicants referred to the availability and confidentiality relating to reproductive and 
preventative sexual health services for teenagers, as contained in Children’s Act,89 
and the consent requirements of the Choice of Termination of Pregnancy Act,90 
requiring only the consent of the pregnant woman for termination of the pregnancy.91 
                                                      
84   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [28]. 
85   Section 54(1)(a) of 32 of 2007. 
86   Sections 50(1)(a)(i) and 50(2)(a)(i) of 32 of 2007. 
87   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [28]. 
88   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [62]; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 7-9. 
89   Section 134 of 38 of 2005. 
90   Section 5(2) of 92 of 1996. 
91   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [49]. 
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Furthermore, the applicants contended that the challenged provisions infringed inter 
alia, the children’s right to dignity,92 privacy,93 bodily and psychological integrity94 as 
well as the best interest principle, as contained in the Constitution.95 The basis for the 
alleged infringements related to the diminishing effect the provisions had on self-
decision making and the mandatory reporting resulting in deprivation of privacy, since 
confidentiality had to be broken. It was argued, furthermore, that the infringement 
could not be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, since the stated 
purpose of the challenged provisions did not bear a rational connection to the result 
achieved thereof. Moreover, the applicants suggested that the state could have 
employed less restrictive means to achieve the stated purpose of the challenged 
provisions.96  
 
3 2  The arguments raised by the respondents 
 
The applicant’s argument was opposed by the respondent in all respects, arguing that 
the challenged provisions do not infringe on any Constitutional rights pertaining to 
children and what was required, was to read the challenged provisions, in light of and 
in combination with, any legislative enactments providing for the rights of children.97 
 
This argument was lengthened with reference to the Children’s Act,98 which the 
respondents contended, provides that any application of legislative enactments, 
relating to children, should be considered in conjunction with the general provisions of 
the Children’s Act,99 and in particular with reference to the method of implementation 
of the challenged provisions, not only having regard to the content thereof.100 
Furthermore, and in addition, the Child Justice Act,101 and as well as the best interest 
                                                      
92   Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
93   Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
94   Section 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
95   Section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 
    10. 
96   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [30]. 
97   The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [61]. 
98   38 of 2005. 
99   Ibid. 
100  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [62]. 
101  75 of 2008. 
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principle contained in the Constitution,102 should act as the guiding principles for the 
implementation thereof.103 The respondents argued that the guiding principles result 
in, amongst others, diversion programs for children, ensuring that the effect of the 
criminal justice system is not harmful, but rather advantageous on the development of 
children.104 This, according to the respondents, demonstrated that there were no less 
restrictive means to achieving the purpose of the challenged provisions, being the 
protection of children from sexual activity, even if consensual, which exposes them to 
risks associated with sexual experimentation.105 
 
The cornerstone of the respondents’ argument was thus that the challenged provisions 
did not create an automatic offence, rather it conferred discretion to prosecute children 
in accordance with the challenged provisions, which would be exercised within the 
confines of the Children’s Act106 and the diversion parameters of the Child Justice 
Act,107 by the National Director of Public Prosecutions or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, depending on the offence in question.108 
 
3 3  Decision and reasoning of the court a quo  
 
In the North Gauteng High Court, it was found that the evidence and arguments 
presented by the applicant clearly demonstrated that the challenged provisions 
caused harm against children, in clear violation of section 28(2) of the Constitution.109 
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity 
between children violated the right to dignity, as guaranteed by the Constitution, of 
children, as it would be degrading and invasive on the personal spheres of the lives of 
children.110 
                                                      
102  Section 28(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
103  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [32]. 
104  Ibid. 
105  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [32]. 
106  38 of 2005. 
107  75 of 2008. 
108  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [67]. 
109  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [74]. 
110  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [76] [77]. 
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It follows that the right to own decision making, regarding reproduction and aspects of 
self-control over the body of the child by him or herself, as well as the right to 
privacy;111 including the method of giving effect to sexuality in the realm of personal 
intimacy,112 as provided for in the Constitution,113 were infringed by the challenged 
provisions.114  
 
The challenged provisions were criticised as providing for state control over the 
personal relationships between children.115 Furthermore, the wide definition of sexual 
violation, was found to be inconsistent with the rights of children, as the interests and 
rights of children were undermined and infringed.116 
 
The court then turned to the two main aspects raised by the respondents in its 
argument, namely diversion and prosecutorial discretion. The court reasoned that 
diversion would not, as the respondents argued, prevent the children from being 
introduced to the formal criminal justice system, as diversion contains elements 
thereof. Thus, the rights of the children concerned were clearly infringed and the 
children would be subject to undue traumatic stress, caused by the criminal justice 
system, resulting from sexual conduct which was consensual in nature. As such, it 
does not have a victim/offender element, as provided for by diversion, thereby 
rendering it inappropriate.117 The argument of prosecutorial discretion being subject to 
judicial review, thereby resulting in the challenged provisions being Constitutional and 
valid, also could not be sustained, since the court held that an unconstitutional criminal 
offence could not be saved by prosecutorial discretion, especially where no guidelines 
for the exercise of discretion exists.118 
 
                                                      
111  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
112  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [81]. 
113  Section 12(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
114  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [78] [79]. 
115  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [83]. 
116  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [84]. 
117  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [88]. 
118  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [90] [92]. 
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In considering whether the limitation passes Constitutional muster in terms of section 
36 of the Constitution, the court referred to the submissions made by the respondents 
and found that the limitations were not rationally connected to the stated purpose of 
the challenged provisions. Furthermore, the challenged provisions were too widely 
constructed, illustrated by the state, criminalising consensual sexual activity between 
children, while having no legitimate interest in the prevention of the said.119  Moreover, 
the court reasoned that less restrictive means could be employed, such as specific 
and narrowly constructed provisions, relating directly to the stated purpose of the 
challenged provisions, being the protection of children from adult sexual offenders.120  
 
The court declared the challenged provisions, being sections 15 and 56(2)(b) of 
SORMA, unconstitutional, including the wording of sexual penetration. The court 
ordered that severance and reading in would be an appropriate remedy, in suggesting 
new wording to section 15 of SORMA, and importantly, included reference to the age-
gap defence, rendering it available for children under the age of 18-years-old who 
engage in consensual sexual penetration with a child less than 2-years younger than 
the alleged offender.121  Furthermore, section 16 and the definition of sexual violation 
were also declared unconstitutional and new wording to the provision was suggested, 
excluding reference to the in age defence for this provision.122  
 
3 4  Decision and reasoning of the Constitutional Court 
 
On 3 October 2013, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment, ruling on the 
invalidation of certain provisions of SORMA, made by the North Gauteng High 
Court.123 The Court approached the judgement, and handed it down, on the premise 
                                                      
119  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [108]. 
120  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [103]. 
121  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [123]. 
122  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [123]. 
123  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [2]. 
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that all persons bear the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Importantly, included 
in this class are children, especially in relation to the right of dignity and privacy.124  
 
Dignity of children, the Court held, is not a notion built up and supported by the rights 
of their parents or that it is only attainable upon reaching a certain age.125 Rather, it is 
a right held by all persons, including children, which protects self-decision making and 
self-worth.126 As such, the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity, decided to be 
entered into consensually by the children concerned, will diminish their dignity as they 
will be stigmatised.127 It followed, that the limitation on the right to dignity of children 
could not be justified in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.128 
 
The court reasoned that the provisions which were under scrutiny were so closely 
connected to personal relationships and sexual preference, that the Constitutional 
right to privacy becomes of particular importance.129 It followed that the need of the 
inclusion of privacy is intensified when considering the mandatory reporting provisions 
contained in SORMA.130 As such, privacy and dignity being entangled with one 
another, were both found to be undermined by SORMA. 
 
In deciding whether the challenged provisions undermined the best interest principle, 
in terms of section 28 of the Constitution, the court had regard to the separate roles of  
the principle.131 The roles being; Firstly, the muster which must be passed for all 
provisions relating to children and secondly, the compass in every case regarding 
children, to determine the right mechanisms and procedures to be followed, having 
                                                      
124  Sections 10 and 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, respectively; The  
   Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 
   (2) SA 168 (CC) [38]. 
125 The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [52]. 
126 Ibid. 
127  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [55]. 
128  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [58]. 
129  Section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The Teddy Bear Clinic for 
    Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC)  
   [60]. 
130  Section 54 of Act 32 of 2007; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and 
    Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [60]. 
131  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [69]. 
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regard to individual children.132 The court, after considering both roles, and having 
conceded with the ruling of the court a quo, regarding prosecutorial discretion and 
inappropriateness of diversion, concluded that the challenged provisions are contrary 
to the best interest principle.133 The court went further, explaining that the challenged 
provisions had the opposite effect than the stated purpose, thereby harming children 
and being irrational in nature.134 
 
“Indeed, it strikes me as fundamentally irrational to state that adolescents do not have the 
capacity to make choices about their sexual activity, yet in the same breath to contend that 
they have the capacity to be held criminally liable for such choices.”135 
 
 
The court, in light of the above, reasoned that the stated purpose did not bear any link 
to the effect actually attained by the challenged provisions.136 Furthermore, on the 
reliance of evidence before it, the court held that there were indeed less restrictive 
means to achieve the stated purpose and on this basis, the limitations could not be 
justified.137 As a result, the challenged provisions did not pass Constitutional muster 
and were declared invalid.138 
 
The fundamental difference in the two judgments relate to the remedy granted by the 
courts. The Constitutional Court found severance and reading-in inappropriate in the 
case before hand. The reasoning for these findings were; Firstly, the intrinsically linked 
provisions, effecting the operation of the entire Act, should one or more provisions be 
severed from the Act, and secondly, the notion of separation of powers, since 
Parliament is best fit to rectify the defect.139 Therefore sections 15 and 16 of SORMA 
                                                      
132  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [69]. 
133  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [72] - [78]; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 12. 
134  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [79]; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 12. 
135  Ibid. 
136  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [94]. 
137  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [101]. 
138  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [100]. 
139  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
    2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [108] [109]. 
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were declared invalid and its operation suspended for a period of 18 months, in which 
Parliament was to remedy the invalid provisions.140 
 
What is important to note, however, is that the Constitutional Court declared the two 
provisions of the Act invalid, only to the extent that children under the age of 16 were 
subject to the imposition of criminal liability. Furthermore, a halt was placed on all 
investigations and/or proceedings against children under the age of 16, as well as 
provisions being made for expungement of the details of children convicted under the 
unconstitutional provisions.141 The court in J v National Director of Public 
Prosecutions142 came to the same conclusion, regarding the infringement of the best 
interest principle, by the mandatory inclusion of the particulars of children in the 
register, who were charged under the unconstitutional provisions.143 The age-gap 
defence, however, was left untouched by the Constitutional Court, whether relating 
sexual violation, as provided for in the original provisions of SORMA, or sexual 
penetration as suggested by the court a quo.144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
140  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [110]. 
141  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [117]. 
142  2014 ZACC 13. 
143   J v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 ZACC 13 [58] – [60] [64]; Stevens 2016 
    PER/PELJ 13-14, 19. 
144  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [117]. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Post Constitutional Court Challenge: Amendments to the Criminal Law  
(Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act  
 
As mentioned above, the invalid provisions of SORMA, hereinafter referred to the 
principle Act, were suspended for a period of 18 months, to allow Parliament to rectify 
the defect.145 After condonation by the Constitution Court for late finalisation, the 
amendments were approved by the majority vote in Parliament and came into force 
on 3 July 2015.146 
 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act,147 
hereinafter referred to as the amendment Act, contains four significant amendments 
to the principal Act. These amendments will now be discussed in detail, followed by 
criticism and remarks regarding the amendments. 
 
4 1   Amendment to the definition of a child  
 
The age differentiation contained in the original definition, relating specifically to 
sections 15 and 16, were removed and replaced with an all-encompassing definition 
of a child, being a person under 18-years-old. Importantly, however, the age 
differentiation is still applicable to sections 15 and 16, however, it is now specifically 
mentioned in the said sections. Although this amendment appears to be of little 
practical assistance, it provides for a broader understanding of the remaining 
provisions of the Act, resulting in an interpretation exercise as some lines become 
blurred.148 
 
                                                      
145  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [110]. 
146 Mahery “The 2015 Sexual Offences Amendment Act: Laudable amendments in line with the  
   Teddy Bear Clinic case” 2015 8 2 SAJBL 4 4. 
147  5 of 2015. 
148  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 4; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 20. 
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Since the preamble of the amendment Act makes express reference to its 
decriminalisation of consensual sexual activity between children of certain ages, it 
relates directly to sections 15 and 16 of the principal Act and brings us to the second 
and third amendments. 
 
4 2  The amendments to section 15 and 16 
 
As discussed above, the age differentiation was removed from the definition of a child 
and subsequently, it was inserted directly into the provisions to which it applies. 
Furthermore, both sections have been amended to remove the possibility of 
prosecution of children, between 12-years-old and 15-years-old, for engaging in 
consensual sexual activity, being penetration in this section 15 and sexual violation in 
section 16. Thus, where both parties are between these ages, no criminal liability will 
be attached to the said activity.149 The amendments relating to sections 15 and 16 
clearly removes the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity between children 
aged 12-years-old to 15-years-old. However, and of importance, is that the stated 
purpose of the principal Act, being the protection of children from adult sexual 
offenders, is given effect to. This can be ascertained from the wording of the sections 
which provides indirectly that sexual penetration or sexual violation will be committed, 
irrespective of the consent of the child, by any person above the age of 16-years-old, 
who engages in such activity with a person between the ages of 12-years-old and 15-
years-old.150 Apart from the decriminalisation of such conduct between the said age 
group, the age-gap defence as contained in section 56(2)(b) of the principal Act, is 
now included in the relevant sections and operate as an exemption from liability,151 
irrespective whether the sexual activity is sexual penetration or sexual violation. This 
then bring us to the fourth amendment. 
 
 4 3  Amendment to section 56  
 
The fourth, and the final amendment of importance in this discussion, is to the age-
gap defence contained in section 56(2)(b) of the principal Act. In terms of the 
                                                      
149  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21. 
150  Ibid. 
151  Ibid. 
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amendments, to sections 15 and 16, no person being between the ages of 16-years-
old and 17-years-old will be criminally liable for the conduct described in these 
sections, provided that there is not more than 2 years’ difference in age between the 
12-year-old and 15-year-old category and the 16-year-old and 17-year-old category. 
Thus, it provides for an absolute exclusion, instead of it operating as a defence. 152 
Furthermore, the Director of Public Prosecution must authorise the prosecution if the 
age gap is more than two years. It is submitted that the deletion of section 56(2)(b) is 
in line, not only with the Constitutional Courts judgment, but also with that of the court 
a quo, since the age-gap defence is now available to not only sexual violation, as 
contained in the principal Act, but also sexual penetration as suggested by the court a 
quo, and operates as an exemption.153  
 
These amendments, however, caused other provisions to operate differently in terms 
of the amendment Act, opposed to the principal Act. These underlying changes will be 
included in the discussion in the section to follow. 
 
4 4 Criticism and remarks of some amendments contained in the amendment Act 
 
What can be seen as a step in the right direction, for the protection of children, is the 
amendments to sections 15 and 16, as contained in the amendment Act. 154 Although 
these sections were considered to be too broad, according to the judgements of the 
court a quo and the Constitutional Court,155 the legislature opted to retain the 
broadness of these sections. However, the broadness was countered by the deletion 
of s56(2)(b), and insertion of the age-gap exemption into the relevant section, which 
now provides for no criminal liability of children who are 16-years-old and 17-years-
old, who engages in consensual sexual activity with children who are less than 2 years 
younger than them. In terms of the principal Act, should the 16-year-old, or 17-year-
old, be prosecuted, he or she could raise the age-gap defence. However, the 
amendment Act provides for no liability in such cases, since it is no offence, which in 
                                                      
152  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5-6; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 23-24. 
153  Ibid; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional  
   Development (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [123]. 
154  Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 20. 
155  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [83] [84]; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused  
   Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [55]. 
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turn renders the age-gap defence an exemption from liability instead of a defence.156 
Although the court in The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Rapcan v 
Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,157 criticised reliance being placed 
on prosecutorial discretion to remedy potentially harmful provisions,158 it was 
nevertheless retained in section 15 and 16. The only difference being its applicability, 
currently being 16-year-olds and 17-year olds who engage in consensual sexual 
activity with other children more than 2-years younger than them.  
 
In the court a quo and in the Constitutional Court, the mandatory reporting provisions 
were considered,159 however, the amendment Act still makes provision for the 
mandatory reporting. Through the criminalisation of consensual sexual activity 
between children in the principal Act, reporting of such conduct became mandatory.160 
This led to the premise that children will no longer seek assistance with issues relating 
to sexual activity and will render advances made to promote safe sex fruitless.161 
However, with the decriminalisation of such conduct, institutions which aim to provide 
guidance and education to children regarding safe sex and to provide them with 
support structures, may do exactly that, without the child fearing prosecution, should 
they seek such guidance. Although section 54 of the principal Act was not amended, 
it is a necessary consequence that, since the conduct is no longer a criminal offence, 
there is no duty to report such conduct between children.162 This understanding is in 
line with the provisions relating to confidential sexual assistance and to reproductive 
and preventative health care services contained in the Children’s Act.163 
 
                                                      
156  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5. 
157  (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 and 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) respectively. 
158  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [91]. 
159  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 [49] [85]; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused  
   Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [28] [60]  
   [73]. 
160  Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 23. 
161  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   (73300/10) [2013] ZAGPPHC 1 par [49] [85]; The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused  
   Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [28] [60]  
   [73]. 
162  Strode, Toohey, Slack and Bhamjee “Reporting underage consensual sex after the Teddy Bear  
   case: A different perspective” 2013 6 2 SAJBL 45 46.  
163  Section 134 of 38 of 2005; Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5. 
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It is submitted, however, that the mandatory reporting provisions, which remained 
unchanged in the amendment Act, are excessively broad. This criticism is lodged even 
though the mandatory reporting provision is no longer applicable where two children, 
between the ages of 12-years-old and 15-years-old, have consensual sexual 
intercourse. The basis for this argument is that there are certain scenarios where the 
mandatory reporting might still be applicable, such as where a 16-year-old engages in 
consensual sexual activity with a 13-year-old. This results in health care practitioners 
and institutions providing sexual assistance being placed in a difficult position, as they 
have a duty to abide by the law, and a duty towards children. Since the activity must 
be reported, it could still result in secondary victimisation, which clearly goes against 
the purpose of SORMA.164  
 
The register, when it is used to its full potential, will play an integral part of the 
protection of children against sexual offenders. However, it was never the intended 
purpose of the register to affect the future of children, through their particulars being 
entered on the database, resulting from consensual sexual intercourse.165 
  
“If our job is to protect our children, why in the heck would we want to make them sex 
offenders for the rest of their lives.”166 
 
  
This was addressed by the Constitutional Court, as mentioned above, through placing 
a halt on all investigations and proceedings against children convicted on the basis of 
the unconstitutional provisions, and expungement of particulars from the register, if 
already entered.167 This was given effect to in the amendment Act, by the insertion of 
section 69A, which provides for the automatic expungement of records.168 Although 
this is in line with the Constitutional Court Judgment, children who were 16-year-old 
and 17-year-old when the offence of sexual penetration, in terms of section 15 of the 
principal Act, was committed, are not included in this automatic expungement. This is 
                                                      
164  Strode et al 2013 SAJBL 47. 
165  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [57]. 
166  Timothy Magow “Proposals seek ‘sensitive balance in teen sexting” (2 November 2010)  
   http://prev.dailyherald.com/story/?id=358446&src=109 (accessed 2018-04-03) Stine “When Yes  
   Means No, legally: An Eighth Amendment Challenge to Classify Consenting Teenagers as Sex 
    Offenders” 2011 60 4 DePaul Law Review 1169 1169 as quoted by Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 2. 
167  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [117]. 
168  Section 69A (b)(iii) of 5 of 2015. 
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notwithstanding the fact that the younger consenting child may have been within the 
2-year age gap. As a result, these children then remain susceptible to restricted 
lifestyles.169  
 
What remains, and what will be embarked on in the following chapter, is to place these 
amendments into the context of the principal Act to ascertain the current legal position 
regarding consensual sexual activity between children.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
169  The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development  
   2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) [57]. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Current legal position regarding consensual sexual activity between 
Children 
 
The point of departure in determining the current legal position is to ascertain the 
definition of a child. According to the amendment Act, a child means any person under 
the age of 18-years-old.170  
 
This is peculiar as the preamble to the amendment Act states its purpose as the 
protection of children, older than 12-years-old but younger than 16-years-old, from 
potential sex offenders. This leads to an anomaly in the definition of a child, as 
contained in the amendment Act, since the preamble, read together with the definition 
of a child and the provisions of section 15 and 16, provides for no less than three 
different age groups to which different provisions are applicable. 171 The three groups 
are: Firstly, children under the age of 12-years-old. Secondly, children above the age 
of 12-years-old and children younger than 16-years-old. Thirdly, children above the 
age of 16-years-old but younger than 18-years-old.172  The three groups will now be 
discussed in more detail in the establishment of the current legal position. 
 
5 1   Children under the age of 12-years-old 
 
The position of children under the age of 12-years-old has not been effected by the 
amendment Act and as such no consent of a child under the age of 12-years-old will 
be valid, as they are deemed incapable of consenting so sexual activity.173 Thus, any 
sexual activity with a person under the age of 12-years-old will result in mandatory 
reporting,174 prosecution and entry of particulars in the register.175 No defence or 
exemption is available to a person who is met with such a charge of rape. 
                                                      
170  Section 1 of 5 of 2015; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 4. 
171  Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 5. 
172  Sections 1, 15 and 16 of 5 of 2015. 
173  Section 57 of 32 of 2007; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 5. 
174  Section 54 of 32 of 2007. 
175  Section 50 of 32 of 2007. 
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5 2  Children older than 12-years-old but younger than 16-years-old 
 
The position with regard to children in this age category were changed by the 
amendment Act, as explained above.176 The preamble to the amendment Act 
expressly states that the age of consent is not changed to 12-years-old and as such 
remains at 16-years-old.177 However, children in this age category may engage in 
consensual sexual activity with one another, whether such conduct fits the definition 
of sexual penetration or sexual violation, without fear of prosecution.178 Even if the age 
difference in this category amounts to more than 2 years, the children will be exempt 
from criminal liability on the basis of their classification in this age category. This is 
expressly provided for in sections 15 and 16.179 As a result, the mandatory reporting 
provision only come into play when the partner of the child in this age category is 16-
years-old or older, and not when the sexual activity is between children in the same 
age category.180 Furthermore, prosecution and entry of particulars in the register is not 
applicable to this age category of children, unless such sexual activity is engaged in 
with children under the age of 12-years-old.181 
     
5 3  Children older than 16-years-old but younger than 18-years-old 
 
This age category remains in a particularly vulnerable position. This is resultant from 
it being included in the definition of a child in the amendment Act, but different 
provisions, defences and exemptions are applicable to this age category. This leads 
to the impression that the legislature attempted to protect children, older than 12-
years-old but younger than 16-years-old, from children older than 16-years-old but 
younger than 18-years-old. As such, there are scenarios where children in this age 
category are treated as if they were adults, engaging in consensual sexual activity with 
a child in the second age category.182  
 
                                                      
176  Chapter 4 above. 
177  5 of 2015. 
178  Sections 15 and 16 of 5 of 2015; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 20. 
179  5 of 2015. 
180  Section 54 of 32 of 2007; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21. 
181  Bhamjee et al 2016 SAMJ 258. 
182  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21-22. 
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Children in this age category may engage in consensual sexual activity with children 
in the second age category, provided that there is no more than two years’ age-gap 
between the partners. Provision is made for this exemption in section 15, relating to 
sexual penetration and section 16, relating to sexual violation.183 No criminal liability 
will follow the parties to the said activity, neither mandatory reporting,184  nor entry of 
particulars in the register,185 provided the age-gap is no more than two years.186 
Furthermore, prosecutorial discretion is applicable in the event that the age gap is 
more than two years. Thus, the child older than 16-years-old but younger than 18-
years-old, will not be automatically be subject to prosecution.187 
 
Moreover, a defence is available to children in this age category. In the event that a 
child, older than 12-years-old but younger than 16-years-old, misrepresent his or her 
age at the time of the alleged offence, as being 16-years-old or older, and the accused 
person reasonably believes this, it may constitute a valid defence.188 However, what 
is important to note is that this is a defence and not an exemption, as with the two-
year age-gap. As such, should the prosecutor decide to prosecute the alleged 
offender, despite him or her being a child, the child will be subject to the criminal justice 
system and will be treated as an accused, until such time as the defence succeeds 
and he or she is acquitted.189 
 
The amendments to SORMA streamlined its application to consensual sexual activity 
between children and has placed children in the last-mentioned age category, in a 
more favourable position, as opposed to the principal Act.190 However, some 
provisions of SORMA remain challenging to implement and further amendments are 
needed to enable the achievement of the stated purposes of the SORMA.191  
 
 
                                                      
183  5 of 2015; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21-22. 
184  Section 54 of 32 of 2007. 
185  Section 50 of 32 of 2007. 
186  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Section 56(2)(a) of 32 of 2007; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 6-7. 
189  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 5; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 6; Subject to diversion options in the Child  
   Justice Act 75 of 2008, which falls outside of the scope of this paper. 
190  Mahery 2015 SAJBL 6; Stevens 2016 PER/PELJ 21. 
191  Strode et al 2013 SAJBL 47.  
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5 4  Misdirected goals and the missed introduction of inquisitorial elements into 
 SORMA 
 
Although the above support the argument of overall protection of vulnerable persons, 
it is submitted that it is inadequate. The reasons for this belief are the extended 
protection which was afforded in the draft bill of SORMA, by the inclusion of 
inquisitorial elements, which never made it into the statutory enactment.192 
 
Since, as stated above, the South African criminal law model is accusatorial and 
retributive in nature and not inquisitorial, the presiding officer takes a passive role and 
ensures that the arguments/confrontation between the accused and the accuser is 
legally fair in nature.193 The presiding officer is not there to question a witness; he is 
there to come to an objective, independent decision on who has presented the best 
argument and fulfilled their burden of proof. Although our criminal justice system does 
contain some inquisitorial elements, which places the emphasis on the presiding 
officers, the draft bill included better measures, which if included, would have had a 
positive effect on the achievement of the least traumatizing protection, and as such 
assist the Act in achieving more of its goals.194 
 
The reason for this argument is as follows, the accusatorial nature of our legal system 
places the victim under severe stress, which could result in secondary victimization. 
Victims are cross-examined and some line of questioning could result in the victim 
becoming susceptible to the very notions the Act attempts to avoid.195  In S v 
Naicker196  the court held that even where witnesses are available, the accusatorial 
system sometimes fails the victims, since they could be victimized. In the draft to 
SORMA it was suggested that the courts should exclude cross-examination which is 
inappropriate, given the age and level of development of the victim.197 Unfortunately, 
                                                      
192  Erasmus 2007 SAPR/PL 509. 
193  Goodpaster “On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial” 1987 78 Journal of Criminal 
   Law and Criminology 118 121.  
194  Erasmus 2007 SAPR/PL 513. 
195  Goodpaster 1987 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 122. 
196  2008 (2) SACR 54 (N), as discussed in De Klerk v S 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) at [18]. 
197  Erasmus 2007 SAPR/PL 513. 
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this proposal never made it into the enactment, as the presiding officer could then, on 
its own accord, step in and stop the line of questioning.198  
 
Although SORMA makes provision for the protection of victims of sexual offences, it 
is submitted that the Criminal Procedure Act,199 hereinafter referred to as the CPA, 
underpins and strengthens the application of these provisions, by providing 
supplementary provisions, which SORMA does not provide for. It is submitted that the 
rape shield in section 227 of the CPA, in terms whereof previous sexual intercourse is 
irrelevant to a case before court, which is not mentioned in SORMA, could have been 
a further amendment in order to advance the protection offered to vulnerable 
individuals. The starting stage of secondary victimization could thus be avoided by the 
inclusion of inquisitorial elements, which were proposed in the draft bill, in the 2007 
enactment, instead of the supplementary provisions in the CPA.200  
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that the determination whether a victim is a vulnerable 
witness should be the very first enquiry before the commencement of any proceedings. 
If such a procedure were to be followed, any possible secondary trauma or 
victimization would have been avoided and the Act would have achieved its goal. 201   
 
Thus, the intention of the legislature is commendable. Indeed, the protection of victims 
from secondary trauma and victimization, does shine through in the Act, albeit any 
through the cracks in the Act. The Act provides for any possible sexual offence and 
provides clarity for the enforcement of this fundamentally important issue. However, 
the Act could have achieved much more, it could be simpler, it could be more lenient 
on the victim and it could be inquisitorial in nature. Taking into consideration the 
creation of Sexual Offences Courts, it could be correctly argued that it is there for a 
reason and that the presiding officer should not just listen, he or she should be involved 
in the process and should guide the line of questioning. If such an approach was found 
to be an infringement of the right to a fair trial of the accused, the CPA would have 
been attacked and the provisions would have been declared unconstitutional. It is thus 
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199  51 of 1977. 
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submitted that there is no logical explanation for the exclusion of inquisitorial elements 
in the amended form of SORMA. 
 
The discussion that follows will shed light on whether future amendments are currently 
being considered. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Current Parliamentary discussions regarding future amendments 
  
After the amendment Act coming into operation no further debates regarding its 
operation or possible future amendments have been tabled in Parliament.202 Instead, 
amendments have been debated for other legislative enactments, to have them 
accord with the amendments contained in SORMA.203 
 
During the Parliamentary debate on the Children’s Amendment Bill,204 to name but 
one, it was conceded that, since the Bill related to children, it should accord with the 
provisions of SORMA.205 The approach of having a rational connection with the 
provisions of SORMA and the Children’s Act206 is clearly consistent with the judgement 
in the Teddy Bear Clinic case.207 Furthermore, the provisions approved by Parliament 
extends the order made by the court, in mentioned case, to the Children’s Act.208  
 
The Children’s Amendment Act,209 which came into operation on 18 January 2017 
, amends the Children’s Act210 to make provision for the following: Firstly, the insertion 
of a cross reference to the Sexual Offences Act211 for the definition of sexual 
offence.212 Secondly, the insertion of a proviso, relating to the register, exempting 
persons who were children at the time of the commission of the offence, as being 
unsuitable to work with children.213 Thirdly, if a child has been convicted of an offence 
                                                      
202  Last Parliamentary discussion on SORMA dated 27 May 2015. Parliamentary Monitoring Group  
   “Justice and Correctional Services: Committee Meetings” (Undated)  
   https://pmg.org.za/committee/38/  (accessed 2018-04-04). 
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206   38 of 2005 as amended by 17 of 2016. 
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in terms of SORMA,214 a court may not order that such a person is unsuitable to work 
with children, unless the prosecutor applies for such an order. Furthermore, the child 
accused must be given the opportunity to state reasons why his particulars should not 
be included in the register, and the court must be satisfied that such an order is justified 
on the basis of compelling circumstances.215 Fourthly, provision is made for the 
application for expungement of particulars from the register, if the person committed 
the offence while he or she was under the age of 18.216 
 
From the above discussion, it becomes clear that Parliament is willing and able to 
amend already enacted legislation to accord with the provisions of SORMA. However, 
no amendments to SORMA, relating to children or vulnerable individuals are currently 
being tabled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
214  Relating specifically to sections 15 and 16 of 32 of 2007. 
215  Sections 120(4) and 120(4A) of 17 of 2016. 
216  Section 128(1) of 17 of 2016. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
“Section 28 requires the law to make best efforts to avoid, where possible, any breakdown 
of family life or parental care that may threaten to put children at increased risk. Similarly, 
in situation where rupture of the family becomes inevitable, the State is obliged to minimise 
the consequent negative effect on children as far as it can.”217 
 
 
Having regard to this quote and the discussion above, it becomes apparent that 
section 28 of the Constitution imposes a great responsibility, in the form of an 
obligation, on the State for the well-being of children. This obligation is given effect to 
by the enactment of legislation by the legislature which protects, promotes and 
advances the rights of children. Whether the obligations to protect children from sexual 
offences have been fulfilled by SORMA remains questionable, especially regarding 
16-years-old and 17-years-old children. 
 
In general terms, SORMA can definitely be seen as a drastic departure from the 
previous position and as such provides adequate protection to children in general. 
However, by assessing specific provisions, some lines become blurred and the true 
intention of the legislature becomes questionable. One of the blurred lines relates to 
the definition of child, as provided for in SORMA, as being a person under 18-years-
old. However, 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds, who are children in terms of SORMA, 
are susceptible to the mandatory reporting provisions, even if the activity is 
consensual. Thus, the children falling in the age category fully protected by section 15 
and 16 have a 3-year age gap in which to engage in consensual sexual activity with 
one another, whereas 16-year-olds and 17-year-old are only provided with a 2-year 
age gap. Since section 15 and 16 of SORMA aims to protect children from adult sexual 
predators, it can hardly be reasoned that it attempts to protect one age category of 
children from another. It cannot be reasoned that 16-year-olds and 17-year olds are 
to be considered adults for the purpose of SORMA, since both SORMA and section 
23(3) of the Constitution provides otherwise.  
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In light of the above, a conclusion can be drawn that the common law applicable to 
sexual offences has to, a certain necessary extent, been codified and/or repealed 
through various legislative enactments relating to sexual offences. Furthermore, these 
legislative enactments have also been repealed and/or amended to reflect the needs 
of persons to whom it is applicable and to accord with the values underpinning and 
rights guaranteed in the Constitution.218 This was illustrated by the amendments to 
SORMA following The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Rapcan v Minister 
of Justice and Constitutional Development219 case, particularly the extension of the 
age-gap defence, to an exemption, applicable to offences involving consensual sexual 
penetration of children. However, since there are no current Parliamentary discussions 
surrounding future amendments to SORMA, one cannot help but wonder whether 
caution is being applied in fear of possible Constitutional challenges or whether the 
legislature awaits a Constitutional challenge before amending offending provisions. As 
a result, the current legal position, as discussed above, appears to be applicable for 
the foreseeable future, despite the need for clarity on certain provisions. 
 
It is respectfully submitted that SORMA, the Act that introduced the criminalisation of 
consensual sexual activity between children and later attempted to decriminalised the 
same, has never fully realised the latter. The reason for this submission is; Firstly, the 
anomaly in the definition of child, as set out above. Secondly, the lack of protection 
afforded to 16-year-old and 17-year-olds, thereby rendering them vulnerable to 
prosecution or diversion, since an offence is committed if the age gap is more than 2-
years. Thirdly, the absurdity of the contrast in the following example: M, 17-years-old 
and F, 14-years-old engage in consensual sexual penetration, while they are in a 
relationship. In this example, both parties are children in terms of the definition, yet 
only M ‘may’, if one applies the prosecutorial discretion proviso, be convicted of 
statutory rape. However, in the following example, no offence of statutory rape is 
committed: M, 15-years-old and F, 12-years-old engage in consensual sexual 
penetration.  
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SORMA could thus be said to provide adequate provisions relating to all possible 
sexual offences. The provisions are not the problem with the Act, the problem relates 
to the application thereof. The reason therefore is the dependence on consent during 
rape trials. If inquisitorial elements were introduced, the focus will shift away from the 
victim and on to the accused, as it should be. The Act, which seems to extend 
protection offered to vulnerable groups, achieved the opposite. The reason for this 
conclusion is because the Act provided much more reasons for vulnerable groups to 
complain, and once they complain – the focus is on them, instead of the accused, and 
the presiding officer is not able to rectify the position. The legal system applicable to 
sexual offences needs inquisitorial elements to soften the procedure applicable to 
victims of sexual offences.  
 
On the strength of the research presented and conclusions drawn in this paper, it is 
submitted that SORMA continues to criminalise consensual sexual activity between 
children. However, the amendment Act restricts its application to a narrower age 
group. The possible prejudice which could be suffered in this age category could 
possibly have been erased, together with the prejudice suffered by the protected age 
groups mentioned in section 15 and section 16 in the principal Act, through a 
constitutional challenge encompassing broader considerations, such as the age 
differentiation contained in SORMA. 
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